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1986 Gerber Lecture
FROM DOCTOR JOHNSON TO JUSTICE HOLMES
TO PROFESSOR LASKI
JEFFREY O'CONNELL AND THOMAS E. O'CONNELL*
DoctorJohnson, Justice Holmes, and Professor Laski: What do
they have in common? Tracing the thought of these three striking
men on matters of religion, economics, government, and law we fol-
low much of the mainstream of Western thought, religious and tem-
poral, from antiquity until today. In addition, by studying the way
each of these men veered away from the thought of his contempo-
raries, we sense the sweep of much of the Western intellectual
tradition.
Samuel Johnson, who lived from 1709 to 1784, represents the
transition from the world of religious faith to the world of temporal
reason. In him we find traditional Christian religion almost literally
a burning issue. Yet Johnson, an extremely rational, analytical man,
intellectually sturdy and independent, represents and portends
much Western thought that is assumed to have undermined and in-
deed cast aside religion. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who lived
from 1841 to 1935, represents our agnostic-indeed atheistic-age,
inclined to dismiss all religions. Harold Laski, who lived from 1893
to 1950, in his turn embraced and embodied the secular religion of
Marxism and redistribution of wealth.
I.
As the subject of the best and best-known biography in Eng-
lish,' Johnson is familiar to most people as a talker, an epigrammist,
* Jeffrey O'Connell, B.A., Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard, 1954, is the
John Allan Love Professor of Law at the University of Virginia; Thomas E. O'Connell,
B.A., Dartmouth College, 1950; M.P.A., Syracuse University, 1952; LL.D., Williams Col-
lege, 1970; Ed.D., University of Massachusetts, 1975, his brother, teaches Spanish at
Bellevue (Washington) Community College. They are writing a book comparing the
friendship of Boswell and Johnson with that of Holmes and Laski; this article is a part of
that book. This article was originally presented by Jeffrey O'Connell as the Lawrence I.
Gerber lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law in December 1986.
1. J. BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON, 6 vols. (G.B. Hill ed., rev. & enlarged by L.F.
Powell, 1934-50). For the best modern life ofJohnson, see W.J. BATE, SAMUEL JOHNSON
(1975, 1977); for a very readable popular life ofJohnson, concentrating mostly on his
early years, seeJ. WAIN, SAMUELJOHNSON (1974).
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a colorful personality. But to retain our interest after two centuries,
Johnson must have been more than a colorful personality. Indeed
he was more. He was a profound moralist, a great writer, and the
man who through his dictionary brought order to the English lan-
guage. He was also a lifelong student of the law.
Johnson was born and raised in Lichfield, England, spent a bit
more than a year studying at Oxford, and lived most of his long life
in London. His childhood and youth were troubled. He had serious
health problems all his life. Large and ugly, he had great difficulty
finding his place either socially or in his work. After leaving Oxford
because of financial difficulties, he went into a profound depression
which lasted for many months. He once said that as a young man he
never tried to please because he thought the task impossible. His
marriage to an older woman, a widow, was an important turning
point for him. Someone, after all, could care about him. After los-
ing her money starting a school that failed, Johnson went to London
to try a career of writing to support them both. Few writers have
had a more difficult time than Johnson in his early effort to earn a
living by his pen. Yet with perseverance and with the opportunities
for writing of all sorts in the bustling London of the mid-eighteenth
century, he gradually began to make a mark, and a living.
The death of his wife Tetty was a great loss to Johnson, but he
rose above his sorrow, made new friends, and continued to build his
reputation. The receipt of a small pension from the Crown freed
him at last from the crushing obligation of supporting himself by
hack writing. Finally he became the lion of London, a much sought-
after guest whose reputation for integrity and intellectual pugnacity
made him one of the most renowned men of his time. His poetry,
essays, and literary criticisms, as well as his dictionary, were widely
read and acclaimed. He became, in short, the Johnson of The Age
of Johnson.
Samuel Johnson is a timeless figure, possibly more so than any
other person in the English-speaking world except Shakespeare.
But for our present purposes Dr. Johnson represents a historical
age, a pivotal transition from the ancient to the modern world, from
the world of religion to the world of reason.
Throughout his life Johnson was deeply religious-religious, a
modern might conclude, to the point of neurosis. For Johnson, the
wrath of God was a literal threat, often crippling him psychologi-
cally. His fear of God's wrath amounted to terror:
Johnson: "[A]s I cannot be sure that I have fulfilled the
conditions on which salvation is granted, I am afraid I may
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be one of those who shall be damned," (looking dismally).
Dr. Adams. "What do you mean by damned?" Johnson.
(passionately and loudly) "Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished
everlastingly!" 2
To exist in pain, after death, was the most Johnson contemplated.
Punishment was what Johnson expected to receive for what he con-
sidered his many sins. These sins included, he believed, sloth, glut-
tony, intemperance, lust, pride, loss of temper, and selfishness, as
manifested by his neglect of his mother.
A highly sexed individual, Johnson was celibate before marriage
to his wife Tetty, during most of the marriage when he was sepa-
rated from her, and after her death (the marriage lasted from 1735
to 1752). It was religious scruple that kept him so. David Hume told
Boswell that Dr. Johnson liked to frequent the lounge of the theater
of his boyhood friend, David Garrick, delighting in the chitchat of
theatrical figures and hangers-on. Eventually, though, Johnson gave
up this amusement for reasons of what Hume called "rigid virtue."
"I'll come no more behind your scenes, David," he told Garrick,
"for the silk stockings and white bosoms of your actresses excite my
amorous propensities. ' '1
Asked once what were life's greatest pleasures,Johnson replied,
"f- g and ... drinking."4 For most of his adult life, though, he
indulged in neither, with all the strains that such abnegation can
lead to.
Religion became, in Johnson's view, the only true means of last-
ing human happiness. As W. Jackson Bate puts it, Johnson came to
believe in "the complete inability of the world and the worldly life to
offer genuine or permanent satisfaction, and our need to turn from
this world in order to seek safety and joy in religious faith and in
another world." 5 Yet for Johnson religion was always a highly ra-
tional affair. Consequently, for Johnson, one of the most analytical
men of any age, the mysteries of religion represented a particular
frustration. In Bate's words:
More than most people, he found it difficult to accept
calmly Elihu's answer to Job's protest-that the wisdom
and justice of God are unsearchable to the human mind;
that we must accept the fact of evil as a "mystery." Not that
2. W.J. BATE, supra note 1, at 451.
3. J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 46 (C. Osgood ed. 1917).
4. J. CLIFFORD, DICTIONARY JOHNSON: SAMUEL JOHNSON'S MIDDLE YEARS 118-19
(1979) (deletion in original).
5. WJ. BATE, supra note 1, at 279.
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Johnson did not try .... But the language [of his efforts] is
always restive and seethes with inner protest.6
Resisting, as Johnson was prone to do, any notion of the un-
knowable, he seized on the idea of afterlife as almost the only possi-
ble means of justifying human fate: Afterlife alone could justify, as
Johnson put it, that "the only thinking being of this globe is doomed
to think merely to be wretched, and to pass his time from youth to
age in fearing or suffering calamities":
It is scarcely to be imagined that Infinite Benevolence
would create a being capable of enjoying so much more
than is here to be enjoyed, and qualified by nature to pro-
long pain by remembrance and anticipate it by terror, if he
was not designed for something nobler and better than a
state in which many of his faculties can serve only for his
7torment....
Prior to the nineteenth century, the primacy of religion was
such that for many centuries religion had used up most of human-
ity's available intellectual energy. Professor M. M. Poston, a distin-
guished economic historian and medievalist, has pointed out the
cause of the absence in medieval life of scientific incentives:
The Middle Ages were the age of faith, and to that ex-
tent they were unfashionable to scientific speculation....
This does not mean that there were not intellectual giants.
All it means is that in an age of faith, men of intellectual
spirit found the calls of faith itself-its elucidation, its con-
troversies, and its conquests-a task sufficient to absorb
them; to put it simply, there was no time for an occupation
like science.'
The story of human life in the Western world from Johnson's
life until today has in large measure been the story of the decline of
religious belief and the rise of rationalism. The spread of rational-
ism, according to Professor A. R. Hall, occurred during the period
1500-1800, a period described by him as "The Formation of the
Modern Scientific Attitude." 9 It culminated in the mid-to-late eight-
eenth century, the period during which the term "scientist" was
6. Id. at 450.
7. Id. at 450-51.
8. Postan, Why Was Science Backward in the Middle Ages?, in A SHORT HISTORY OF SCI-
ENCE 11, 12-13 (1959), quoted in Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 54 VA. L. REV. 689, 695 n.15 (1968).
9. A. HALL, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLuTION 1500-1800 xii. (2d ed. 1962), quoted in
Woodard, supra note 8, at 695 n.15.
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coined by William Whewell and, in the words of A. N. Whitehead,
"the greatest invention . .. was the invention of the method of in-
vention."10 In place of religion as the touchstone of thought came
thought itself in the form of conceptualism and the scientific order-
ing of knowledge.
Johnson's life largely coincided with the last century of this pe-
riod between 1500 and 1800. In Johnson we see a dynamic interac-
tion between worship and skepticism, between piety-rarely has
there been a more pious man-and rationalism. This brings us to
Johnson's great capacity as a rationalist in an age flowering into ra-
tionalism-flowering, indeed, into the Age of Reason. In all the
English-speaking world no one epitomized more than Johnson the
rise of rationalism, so much so that the Age of Reason in England
came to be known as the Age of Johnson.
As to the range of Johnson's learning, William Adams, who was
his tutor during Johnson's brief stay at Oxford, mentioned to Bos-
well about fifty years later (in 1776), "I was his nominal tutor; but he
was above my mark."'" Boswell relates that Adams told Johnson
that Johnson was the best qualified scholar he ever knew come to
Oxford. Adam Smith, a grudging critic who did not like Johnson,
and no mean authority, opined that "Johnson knew more books
than any man alive."' 2
Johnson's dictionary stands as an almost incredible tribute to
the exhaustive range of his learning. The dictionary is an awesome
compendium of knowledge of all kinds, literary and scientific,
greater than any other ever assembled by one person in all the his-
tory of the world. Bate tells us that for over a century after its publi-
cation it was without a rival. It set the pattern for all subsequent
dictionaries, with its pertinent and often piquant examples of the
use of a word in literature, a technique never tried before and never
abandoned since.13
Only a person with an incredible range of knowledge would
have undertaken-not to speak of completed-such a herculean
task. Johnson indeed stands alone, or perhaps is joined only by
Thomas Jefferson, for intense application of sheer brainpower
across the spectrum of human experience. Much more than Jeffer-
10. A.N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 98 (1948), quoted in Wood-
ard, supra note 8, at 695 n.15.
11. W.J. BATE, supra note 1, at 106-07.
12. Id. at 35.
13. Id. at 251-52; see R. DEMARIA, JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY AND THE LANGUAGE OF
LEARNING (1986).
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son, though, did Johnson seek to understand the emotions, his own
as well as others. Even today, in an age of Freudian psychology,
when we are emotionally troubled we will find Johnson has much to
teach us. But withal, for all his rationalism, Johnson remained deeply
religious.
From early on until the end of his lifeJohnson was fascinated by
the law and perceived its rich interaction with religion. Late in his
life this interest in the law provoked one of his friends to remark
that had he pursued the law he might well have become Lord Chan-
cellor. Barked Johnson, "Why will you vex me by suggesting this,
when it is too late?"' 14
Recent years have revealed Johnson's authorship in the 1760s
of much of the Vinerian lectures in law by Robert Chambers. 15
Chambers was a young friend of Johnson's when Chambers was ap-
pointed Blackstone's successor at Oxford. Blackstone had made his
Oxford lectures the basis for his enormously important Commentaries
on the Laws of England, first published in 1765. Chambers was under-
standably diffident at the prospect of having his lectures compared
to Blackstone's, and he became totally blocked, unable even to start
the preparation of his own series of lectures. Johnson, hearing of
his friend's dilemma, offered to help-anonymously of course, since
knowledge of Chambers' need for such help, particularly from a
nonlawyer, would have been an additional humiliation. Johnson
proceeded to write a great share of Chambers' lectures. That share
shows an uncanny grasp of the subtleties as well as the fundamentals
of the law as it had developed up to the 1760s in England.
By the eighteenth century the law, like other aspects and disci-
plines of human life, had undergone secularization. Initially, law had
been shrouded in religion. Indeed, in Johnson's portion of the
Vinerian lectures he traces the rise of law directly from religion.
Wild, savage warlords emerged as leaders in primitive societies in
which brute strength was everything-except to one class: priests.
The clergy, with no strength of arms, were able to wrest respect for
themselves from even the most powerful by evoking fear of the only
force bigger than warrior lords: fear of the Divine and of the after-
life. Thus, the one civilizing force, the one force able to rise without
the use of physical strength and aggressiveness, was the clergy. As
the clergy's civilizing influence slowly and torturously grew, the lib-
14. W.J. BATE, supra note 1, at 84-85.
15. For the remarkable story ofJohnson's role in Chambers' Vinerian lectures, see E.
MCADAM, DR. JOHNSON AND THE ENGLISH LAW 65-122 (1951). For another view, see A.
MCNAIR, DR. JOHNSON AND THE LAW 76-80 (1948).
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erating amenities of art and music began to spread in order to serve
religious purposes. As men took the first steps toward civilization,
with concomitant needs for writing and reading and recordkeeping
and, ultimately, for more advanced administration, the tools to ac-
complish these subtle, unsoldierly tasks were held by clergy. With
further advances in civilization came the need for regulation other
than by direct application of force and fear, namely law. This too
evolved under the clergy, the only bookish people, the only ones
capable of writing and administering law.' 6
Johnson was of that first generation to see law not as divinely
inspired or mystically revealed but rather as reflecting the society it
tried to regulate. That generation's thinking with respect to the law
was dominated by Blackstone, who in the Commentaries went a long
way to demystify the law and create a theory of the Common Law as
a rational system. It was a generation that looked at law with the
cool analytical eye of the Age of Reason.17
Johnson was also of the generation, dominated in economics by
Adam Smith, that developed an acute appreciation of the strength
of the market. Johnson too perceived the liberating, if sometimes
anarchic, fruits of a market economy. Unlike many intellectuals of
his day and ours, Johnson was fascinated by the world of business, a
fascination more consistent with being a Whig than a Tory. But for
all his humble beginnings and compassion for the downtrodden,
Johnson remained throughout his life a Tory, conservative in poli-
tics and in his general social beliefs. A deep commitment to order
and hierarchy dominated his life; he was, for example, a bitter and
outspoken opponent of the American Revolution.
In short, Johnson was Janus: with his conservative religious be-
liefs he looked back into history from the eighteenth century; with
his rationalism and cool analysis of any and all concepts and ideas
he looked forward into the swiftly changing world of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
II.
Fifty-seven years afterJohnson's death in 1784, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., was born in Boston.' 8
It would be hard to imagine an early life more different from
16. E. MCADAM, supra note 15, at 110-11.
17. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
18. For the life of Holmes, see 1 M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
(1957); 2 M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1963). For the correspondence
between Holmes and Laski, see HOLMES-L.AsEi LETrERS (M. Howe ed. 1953, 2 vols.)
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Johnson's than Holmes'. As a boy, Holmes was healthy, robust and
happy. The son of the famous Autocrat of the Breakfast Table and
author of Old Ironsides, descended from generations of ministers
from New England's earliest time, Holmes had early good fortune in
all respects. He grew up comfortably surrounded by stimulating rel-
atives and friends. While the impoverished Johnson had to leave
Oxford early, Holmes sailed through Harvard and capped his col-
lege years as Class Poet at his graduation in 1861. How quickly,
though, came his own period of trial, comparable to Johnson's early
poverty and physical and mental anguish: His searing service in the
Union Army.
After the Civil War, Holmes went on to the Harvard Law
School, travelled in Europe, tried-unsuccessfully, on the whole-
practicing law. He was, his friend William James thought, too ambi-
tious, too coldly intellectual. He did indeed hunger for professional
success and acclaim but, as with Johnson, these did not come easily
or early. Only as he was turning forty was The Common Law pub-
lished, the book that made his reputation. Soon after the publica-
tion of The Common Law Holmes was appointed to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. The rest of his long and useful life he
served on the bench, following up nearly twenty years of Massachu-
setts service with more than thirty years on the United States
Supreme Court. He became the most widely known American
judge. Like Johnson, he became an intellectual giant of his age.
LikeJohnson, all of his long life Holmes dearly loved to think, and to
talk and to read.
Holmes married a childhood friend. It was on the whole a long
and happy marriage, but Holmes, again like Johnson, had no
children.
Although born not so long after Johnson's death, Holmes' reli-
gious beliefs (or lack of them) represent a world apart from John-
son's. Religion for Holmes was sheerest fantasy, ludicrous in its
pretension. Humans and their world had no more ultimate signifi-
cance than ants and their hill. To imagine that humans and their
foolish, petty, trifling concerns were distinguished by Divine inter-
est, not to speak of guidance, was to make a mockery of serious
thought. Wrote Holmes to Laski in 1929:
[I] see no reason for attributing cosmic importance to man
... I regard him as I do the other species (except that my
[hereinafter LETrERS]. For a superb essay on Holmes, see E. WILSON,Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, in PATRIOTIC GORE 743 (1962).
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private interests are with his) having for his main business
to live and propagate, and for his main interest food and
sex. A few get a little further along and get pleasure in it,
but are fools if they are proud [because of it].' 9
Holmes was, of course, part of a generation that more and more
rejected religion-part of the nineteenth century that turned to
knowledge and, even more particularly, to science in place of God.
As Professor G. E. White puts it: "Religious and spiritual principles
appeared to [the late nineteenth century intelligentsia in America]
to have been made obsolete by more measurable rules of science.
The universe, they had discovered, could be explained in terms of
recurrent, predictable phenomena such as evolution and
competition." 0
Not only religion but morality, or moral beliefs, were transient
and meaningless in Holmes' eyes. No system of thought, no moral
code, had any meaning except that the crowd-the mob-found it
convenient to follow it. The mob or the mob's offspring might
shortly or ultimately abandon such a code. It was, said Holmes,
convenient to live in a world in which honesty, trust, intellect,
beauty, democracy, and free speech were honored, but one would
have little cause for complaint if such codes were swept away to-
morrow. Had not one or more been absent in most societies
throughout history?
In a letter to Laski Holmes wrote:
You respect the rights of man-I don't, except those things
a given crowd will fight for-which vary from religion to
the price of a glass of beer. I also would fight for some
things-but instead of saying that they ought to be I merely
say they are part of the kind of world that I like-or should
like. You put your ideals or prophecies with the slight su-
perior smile of a man who is sure that he has the future-(I
have seen it before in the past from the abolitionists to
Christian Science) and it may be so. I can only say that the
reasoning seems to me inadequate and if it comes to force I
should put my [illegible] on the other side.2'
The depth of Holmes' bleak view of life is perhaps best revealed
by his attitude toward having children. According to his old friend
Learned Hand:
19. 2 LE-rrERS, supra note 18, at 1125.
20. White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 51, 55 (1971).
21. 2 LETrERS, supra note 18, at 948.
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We were sitting together in the library sometime after his
wife's death. I do not know how I ventured on so intimate
a subject, but in some way the question did come up and I
said to him: "Mr. Justice have you ever been sorry that you
never had children?" He said nothing; he did not look at
me, he waited for a perceptible time and then said very qui-
etly (still not looking at me): "This is not the kind of world
I want to bring anyone else into. "22
For Holmes a dominant influence was Darwin. In Holmes' view
the law of human existence was the struggle for survival and advan-
tage. And Holmes echoed Adam Smith in seeing the pursuit of self-
interest as a fundamental animating force in society for both eco-
nomic and other ends. The struggle for life against the organic and
inorganic forces seeking its destruction, wrote Holmes in 1873,
"does not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is
equally the law of human existence .... It is mitigated by sympathy,
prudence, and all the social and moral qualities. But in the last re-
sort a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neigh-
bors." 23 In 1915 Holmes wrote to Dean John Wigmore that "the
squashy sentimentalism of a big minority of our people about
human life" made him "puke." He was talking about those "who
believe in the upward and onward-who talk of uplift, who think
that something particular has happened and that the universe is no
longer predatory." 24
So Holmes dismissed the thought that history meant some inev-
itable progress toward higher standards of human behavior. As for
economics, he found the "do goodism" of his close friend Harold
Laski "drool." Redistribution of wealth to the poor from the rich
was futile and wrongheaded, although the pressure for it was under-
standable given the inevitable envy of the poor for the rich. Redis-
tribution was futile because the few rich never have enough to
provide for the many poor. It was wrongheaded because there was
no inherent reason to disrupt the status quo by taking from one to
give to another. But if the "mob," either by bullets or ballots, was
determined to redistribute wealth, one could only fight or shrug.
One could not insist one was wronged in any ultimate sense.
Over all hung Malthus:
[T]o my mind [he wrote Laski on May 24, 1919] the notion
22. 2 M. HOWE, supra note 18, at 8 n.17. Later, Holmes said that he didn't have
children because it would have interfered with his career. Id.
23. The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717, 795 (1931).
24. 1 M. HOWE, supra note 18, at 25.
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that any rearrangement of property, while any part of the
world propagates freely, will prevent civilization from kill-
ing its weaker members, is absurd. I think the crowd now
has substantially all there is-and that every mitigation of
the lot of any body of men has to be paid for by some other
or the same body of men-and I don't think that cutting off
the luxuries of the few would make an appreciable differ-
ence in the situation.25
I think the courageous thing to say to the crowd, [he
wrote Laski on January 8, 1917] though perhaps the Bran-
deis School don't [sic] believe it, is, you now have all there
is-and you'd better face it instead of trying to lift your-
selves by the slack of your own breeches. But all our pres-
ent teaching is hate and envy for those who have any
luxury, as social wrongdoers.26
For Holmes the central event in his life was the Civil War. His
striking military mustaches were carefully tended throughout his
adult life; his erect soldier's posture remained until ancient age bent
him; he never stopped memorializing the dates of great battles in
which he had fought-especially those in which he had been
wounded-on his correspondence, even when writing to those with
whom he was not intimate. In Maryland, it is especially pertinent to
cite the following from his letters: "31 years and one day after An-
tietam," he would write, or "Antietam was 65 years ago yesterday,"
"We are celebrating Antietam, where had a bullet gone one-eighth
of an inch differently the chances are that I should not be writing to
you.'1 27 It was no coincidence that having been wounded in the
neck "the instinct for the jugular" became one of his favorite
phrases. 2
He had marched off as a twenty year old lieutenant a few weeks
after his graduation from Harvard College, full of Boston's idealism
and enthusiasm for abolition. He was wounded seriously three
times. Once he was left for dead. He saw his friends killed and
maimed in the terrible carnage of that first modern war. He came to
feel that nothing, no creed or abstraction, was worth the slaughter
he saw. The only thing that justified it was man's incredibly heroic
willingness to undergo it, but that was as true for one side as for the
other, as true for those who would retain slavery as for those who
25. 1 LE=rrRS, supra note 18, at 207.
26. Id. at 52.
27. E. WILSON, supra note 18, at 743, 758.
28. Id. at 760.
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would abolish it. Those who were indifferent to the great causes but
were simply doing their duty were for Holmes the most heroic of all.
So Holmes became the ultimate skeptic, distrusting all "dogmas" or
"systems," including not only old religions but new ones, such as
socialism.
Whence Holmes' great reputation as a liberal, then? It
stemmed from two things: First as ajudge he was often willing to let
the legislature experiment as it would with social reform, little as he
personally believed in reform. This was in contrast to the narrow
views of his contemporaries on the bench who were often ready to
strike down social legislation on constitutional grounds. Second,
the constitutional principle he came to defend most aggressively was
that of Free Speech, believing as he did in the "marketplace of
ideas." Better to let an idea, however pernicious, be born to live or
die in battle with other ideas than to abort it by censorship or other
suppression.
Holmes' seminal book The Common Law 29 was a key event in the
transformation of law from oracle to echo. True, the rationalism
that led to Blackstone's Commentaries had demystified the law some-
what, but Blackstone had replaced one dogma (a religious one) with
another (a rational one). Blackstone's law still came from on high,
but it came from the Common Law as a perfect system, slowly and
wondrously revealing itself case by case-by an "invisible hand," as
it were, similar to that which guided Adam Smith's marketplace.3 0
29. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
30. On the interconnection between the lawyer's reasonable man and the econo-
mist's economic man in the eighteenth century, Paul Carrington has perceptively
pointed out that each stems from the same mode. Both Blackstone and Adam Smith
were determined to pluck "reason" from that nettle "life." According to Carrington, the
extensive economic analysis of law by lawyer-economist Richard Posner can be viewed
as reuniting
two divergent strands of rational intellectual tradition, the classic economic ra-
tionalism sired by Adam Smith and the common law rationalism which can be
said to date from William Blackstone. ...
... Blackstone and Smith each wrote with an extraordinarily lucid, if some-
what oracular, style.... While Smith analyzed markets and Blackstone analyzed
court decisions, both proceeded from the assumption that human behavior is
essentially, if not completely, rational .... Both Blackstone and Smith were
prone to attribute to human rationality a commanding force over social institu-
tions and relationships ....
It is not hard to find a cause of the similarity between Blackstone and
Smith. Smith was born in the early summer of 1723 in Scotland, Blackstone a
month later in London. Blackstone studied at Oxford from 1738 to 1746;
Smith was at Oxford from 1740 to 1748. Smith began lecturing in Glasgow in
1751, Blackstone at Oxford in 1753. Blackstone's great work was completed in
1769, Smith's in 1776. Smith was the more creative of the two and had much
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Principles revealed in earlier cases could be perceived and applied
in later ones by well-trained lawyers and judges. It was Holmes
more than anyone else who overturned the concept of law as a tran-
scendentally rational set of principles ineluctably revealed as case
followed case. Consider the very first words of The Common Law:
"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience
.... "31 Holmes went on to use his deep legal learning with brilliant
virtuosity to show the law to be an adaptive, swirling kaleidoscope,
reflecting today's needs along with bits and pieces of prior law, in
turn reflecting prior days. "The prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law, ' 3 2
said Holmes. The law is not "some brooding omnipresence in the
sky,"' 3 ' but the command of a sovereign triggered by a court's de-
cree. Thus was born legal realism, a view cynical in the eyes of
many, asserting that the law is a reflection of the prejudices and
predilections of the dominant forces in society, usually articulated
by middle-aged, upper-class males in ceremonial black robes which
suggest the sacred. Holmes was, ironically, proud to number himself
among that group.
Holmes' concept of the law was sharply divided. If he was the
first legal realist who saw the law as simply the command of the sov-
ereign, in turn dependent on society's acceptance of the sovereign's
authority and thus ultimately subject to all the vicissitudes of the
public's views and tastes, he also saw the law as a highly complex,
intricate set of rules, awesome in their variety and particularity.
Surely the mob couldn't care about those. Surely such rules of
property or contract or tort law were not known to the mob or the
subject of their passionate concern.
No, for Holmes the law ultimately depended on the willingness
of the sovereign to enforce the law and society's agreement that the
law should be enforced. But in the great mass of legal disputes, the
specific matter was of no concern to the mob. What did the mob
care whether common law marriage required an actual agreement to
be explicitly married at some precise moment in time or might be
the greater impact, but the influence of both can be seen in the development of
many . . . thinkers who succeeded them ....
Carrington, Book Review, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 187, 187 (reviewing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)). See alsoJ. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT
INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 199-200 (1975) (discussing the lawyer's Rea-
sonable Man and the economist's Economic Man; citing Carrington).
31. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 29, at 1.
32. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
33. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916).
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effected by general submission to the marital state over time-a per-
fect example of a technical legal issue. 34 Within such interstices of
the law, lawyers-and judges-had wide discretion in formulating
technical rules that would simply "work."
Law for Holmes was ultimately no more sacred than matters of
garbage disposal. Law was simply an instrument by which life was
made more amenable. But if law were simply the command of a
sovereign, a cruel and brutal sovereign could just as readily and val-
idly command obedience to law as a more benign ruler. So bleak
was Holmes' theory as to the ultimate validity of the law that during
World War II his thinking was bitterly attacked by Jesuit scholars as
endorsing (by implication) Nazi rule and Nazi law:3 5 Who could
doubt that Hitler was the sovereign? According to Holmes' "cyni-
cal" view, there seemed no basis in law for the Germans to oppose
Hitler. Their only alternative was revolution.
How to defend Holmes from such assaults? Paul Freund of the
Harvard Law School, replying to such broadsides, took refuge in
asserting that "such critics are surely lacking in humor no less than
in perception, for no one could associate a totalitarian outlook with
Holmes' dedication to the preservation of the free market in ideas
and the even-handed administration of justice. '"36 That will strike
some as a rather thin defense, even if one perceives it as a valid one.
III.
If Holmes represents the rejection of Johnson's religion and a
much more exclusive commitment to rationalism and realism, Har-
old Laski 7 represents what is tantamount to a rebirth of religion.
But it is a very different kind of religion from Johnson's. Laski's
Marxism, in which he believed with a faith that was religious in its
intensity, combined the rationalism of science, in the sense that
Marx believed his theories were scientific, with the emotional and ro-
mantic theory of creating a "new Jerusalem in England's green and
lovely land."
Though junior by fifty years, Laski became Holmes' great
friend. Their friendship, indeed, had many of the characteristics of
Johnson's lovely friendship with his own much younger intimate,
34. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 443 (1906) (dissenting opinion).
35. See White, supra note 20, at 65-68.
36. Freund, Oliver Wendell Holmes, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969, at 1755, 1761 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969).
37. For the life of Laski, see K. MARTIN, HAROLD LASKI: A BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR
(1953); G. EASTWOOD, HAROLD LASKI (1977).
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James Boswell. Like Boswell, Laski was an outcast of sorts: Laski
the Jew, Boswell the Scot. Each befriended an Olympian figure, the
great figure of his age, and carried on for twenty years a warm,
symbiotic relationship that was partly junior to mentor, partly son to
father, partly stimulating mind to stimulating mind. Laski was
quintessentially the intellect. Of astonishing precociousness when
Holmes first met him when he was twenty-three, Laski became a
marvelous teacher and prolific writer at the London School of Eco-
nomics where he passed most of his professional life.
Laski was born in Liverpool, went to Oxford, and during World
War I found himself in America as a teacher at Harvard, the proteg6
of Felix Frankfurter, who first brought Laski and Holmes together.
The son of a well-to-do OrthodoxJewish merchant family, Laski had
married a gentile woman eight years his senior while he was a stu-
dent at Oxford. He had thus defied his conservative family, who
retaliated fiercely, cutting him off financially and emotionally. Thus
Laski too faced a cruel crisis in his early manhood. He was ulti-
mately reconciled with his family, but was never a practicing Jew,
and until the Nazi persecution of Jews in World War II never felt
identity as a Jew.
A man of great generosity and enormous intellectual energy,
Laski had a penchant for exaggeration. This limited his effective-
ness as a man of affairs which a side of him wanted very much to be.
Like Boswell, and in marked contrast to their two older friends,
Laski burned himself out and died at the relatively young age of
fifty-six.
As for Johnson's religious belief, or indeed any form of obei-
sance to a Supreme Being, Laski loathed it even more than Holmes
did. For Laski religion was a sham, a corrupting, corrupted whore,
more responsible than anything else for man's degradation and ac-
quiescence in that degradation. Religion was hypocritical in pur-
porting to reach for the sky while in fact it was buried in the coarsest
and often most materialistic self-interest. But, as is true of many
intellectuals, Laski longed for the sacred, for the purest, ideal goal.
He found it in Marxism. For Laski, it was clear that the day would
come, whether peacefully or by violence, when the laborer would
gain ascendancy; when that day came, beauty and trust and compas-
sion-and even individualism-would flourish in a new world of
economic egalitarianism. Laski had originally hoped the aristocracy
and the bourgeoisie would assent to the displacement of their au-
thority and power, but if not, the displacement would be won by
blood.
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Early on Laski had a passionate commitment to political free-
dom. He was deeply hostile to governmental power. On occasion
he gave voice to deep reservations about Stalinist totalitarianism.
But he saw it as an understandable blemish in society's first experi-
ment with a new order, a blemish that ought not dissuade more ad-
vanced countries-especially the United Kingdom with its deep
tradition of civility-from embracing socialism and rejecting capital-
istic values.
In his earlier period right after World War I Laski wrote what
has been termed his "Big Four": Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty
(1917), Authority in the Modern State (1919), The Foundations of Sover-
eignty (1921), and A Grammar of Politics (1925). At that point in his
development Laski distrusted political power and politicians who
wielded that power. He came later to feel that egalitarianism was
more important than political pluralism. If centralized governmen-
tal control was necessary for a fairer distribution of goods, so be it.
Increasingly Laski felt that citizens as consumers were slighted
by the existing systems of government in the Western world and
that the structures of government were in effect rigged against
change in the distribution of economic means. In part it was his
involvement in the affairs of the early British Labour Party that
prompted him to change his mind about what was most important in
British governmental structures. The accession to power of the Mc-
Donald Labour government in 1929 was the cause of great hope for
Laski and his fellow party supporters. His later disillusionment with
the McDonald government dashed Laski's hopes of a ready solution
to the dilemma of bringing about egalitarian democracy.
The obstacle was the enormous power of what Laski perceived
as the aristocratic political parties, parties that in Laski's view were
anachronistic. George Feaver points out that
the general success of representative government in the
nineteenth century, Laski believes, was the result of an un-
derlying agreement between the parties on fundamental
principles. All concerned accepted without question the
premise of an unequal society, a state of affairs which
[Laski] argues is no longer tenable [since] one of the par-
ties to the contemporary debate rejects the premise out of
hand.38
38. G. Feaver, Intellectuals and Politics: Harold Laski Revisited, A Paper Prepared
for Delivery at the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Associ-
ation, University of Toronto, June 3-6, 1974, at 41.
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It was a great setback, in Laski's view, that McDonald's Labour
government would agree to be a mere foundation block for a more
general national government composed of all factions. The result in
Laski's thinking was a swing away from pluralism to Laski's own par-
ticular brand of Marxism. This swing represents the final phase of
his political development. Feaver writes that "Laski was certain the
capitalists had sabotaged the 1929 Labour government and would
do so again."39
Laski's point of view led him to entertain serious doubts about
the very continuation of democratic government in Britain. From
then on, Laski's books took on an increasingly Marxist tendency,
and in The Crisis and the Constitution (1931), Democracy in Crisis (1933),
and Parliamentary Government in England (1938) we discern a growing
conviction that the state "is in practice ... a thinly disguised mecha-
nism for maintaining a given system of class relations."4" After that,
we see a conviction on Laski's part that Marxism is the answer to all
problems related to governmental structure. Neither social reform
nor fair economic distribution, in his view, could be effected as long
as the ruling classes in England have in effect a veto power over
change.
As Laski's conviction grew that Marxism was the answer, we see
in him an increasing religious fervor concerning the need for Marx-
ist change and the panacea that would result from such a change.
He had earlier written:
The compelling strength of communism is that it has a
faith as vigorous, as fanatic, and compelling as any in the
history of religions. It offers dogmas to those whom skepti-
cism troubles; it brings to its believers the certitude which
all great religions have conferred; above all, perhaps, it im-
plants in its adherents the belief in their ultimate
redemption. 4"
Laski's 1944 book Faith, Reason and Civilization was his most ex-
plicitly religious book. At the time the book was written Laski was
engaged in a political tussle with Churchill and others with respect
to the degree to which labor support of the war effort should or
should not include commitments to radical change in the post-war
world. Laski felt that the fervor engendered by the war effort
against a common foe should be used as a springboard to bring
39. Id.
40. Id. at 42.
41. H. LASKI, COMMUNISM 246 (1927).
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about essential change in social structures immediately after the
war. And, in Laski's fervently held view, the commitment to those
changes should be made before the war ended.
Faith, Reason and Civilization develops the theme of early Chris-
tian fervor as not only analogous to the fervor for defeating a com-
mon foe during the war but also as analogous to the fervor for
revolution in the Western world as epitomized by the Russian
Revolution. Laski wrote:
Faith in the revolution possesses for its devotees the same
kind of magic hold as Christianity exercised over its first
followers. It is a call to what is highest in man, and a call to
the fulfillment of what is highest not merely as an offering
upon an altar of self, as the promotion of a private interest,
but as a contribution to a fellowship in which selfhood is
fulfilled in the context of a greater purpose by which it is
absorbed.42
At the time of Laski's death, Max Beloff referred to "The Age of
Laski." 43 Daniel Patrick Moynihan in a seminal article has pointed
out that Laski's influence on the Third World remains primary and
persuasive.44 England's former colonies are governed by former
Laski pupils, or pupils of those pupils. These Laski disciples profess
determination to bring "Jerusalem" to their often barren lands by
Laski's version of socialism. They are Marxist but many are none-
theless nervous in the shadow of Russia (and one could add, since
Laski's death, many are also nervous about China).
Like Johnson, Laski was not a lawyer. But also like Johnson,
Laski thought and wrote a great deal about the law. Laski was for a
long time the leading Englishman in understanding and advocating
the use of legal realism. He was unusual in recognizing the impor-
tance of understanding the political, economic, social, and even per-
sonal bases of British legal decisions, and how much such nonlegal
factors influence and even dominate decisions of courts of law.
Laski was often a voice crying in the wilderness for the reform of
English legal education and legal thinking. But at least some of the
changes he advocated have gradually taken place in England.45
42. H. LASKI, FAITH, REASON AND CIVILIZATION 53 (1944).
43. Beloff, The Age of Laski, FORT. REV. 378-84 (June 1950).
44. Moynihan, The United States in Opposition, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1975, at 31, 44.
45. Compare, e.g., 1 LETTERS, supra note 18, at 547 (Laski deprecating one Lord
Atkin's "curious legal conservation which regards principles as eternal instead of ap-
proximations to . . . the truth") with P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 660-71 (1979) (decrying the mechanistic formalism of English law during the
period 1870-1970).
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IV.
If Laski rejected both Johnson's religion and Holmes' skepti-
cism, Holmes in return, as we have seen, rejected both Johnson's
and Laski's faiths. Indeed, Holmes represents another great strain
that has dominated so much thought in the twentieth century: Exis-
tentialism. For all his skepticism and cynicism about the purpose of
life or of the cosmos, Holmes deeply believed in living life intensely.
He relished into ancient age, his work, his pleasures, including his
reading, his friendships, his memories. He loved his wife deeply
and their life together was zestful and intensely close. If nothing
was of lasting importance, living as though things were was man's
glory. How else explain his struggling with Greek texts into his
nineties in order to improve his mind? He gloried in understanding
deeply and experiencing fully all facets of life from the trivial to the
weighty, from the physical to the ethereal. To grow, to live, to love,
to laugh, to fight, to think, to be were all in and of themselves glo-
ries, no matter how little they might ultimately lead to. If ultimately
all was to be ashes, the fire was nonetheless warming while it lasted.
With such a bleak, yet paradoxically uplifting philosophy,
Holmes anticipated Camus and other Existentialists. Indeed such a
philosophy may be the real religion of most sophisticated modern
men and women. But the religions of Johnson and Laski are, if
wounded, by no means dead. For many all over the world they re-
main as vibrant as ever. Doctor Johnson, Justice Holmes, and Pro-
fessor Laski continue to live among us yet.
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